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Using a model similar to labor market models of statistical discrimination, I de-
scribe how and why racial pro¯ling can arise even when law enforcement o±cers are
racially unbiased. Speci¯cally, if one racial group has a higher fraction of individuals
who are at risk of committing the relevant type of crime than another, and if law
enforcement o±cers can observe a noisy signal of guilt in addition to an individual's
race, then it will be optimal for o±cers to treat observationally equivalent individu-
als of di®erent races di®erently. Moreover, this model can be used to show how the
e®ect of a racially colorblind policy on the overall crime rate for a particular type
of crime will depend on the racial make-up of the relevant jurisdiction, the relative
proportions of each racial group that are at risk of choosing to commit that crime,
the proportion of the relevant population that o±cers can observe, the magnitude
of the punishment for that particular type of crime, and distribution of the bene¯ts
to committing that particular crime. The implications coming from this analysis
are then applied and analyzed with respect to two speci¯c contexts|highway patrol
vehicle searches for drugs or weapons, and border patrol investigations of foreign
entrants for terrorist connections.
¤Thanks to Seungjin Han and participants in the McMaster Economics Seminar for their helpful
comments. JEL codes K14, K42, J71
11 Introduction
Racial pro¯ling by law enforcement o±cers, or \using race as a factor in conducting
stops, searches, and other investigative procedures," [Bush, 2001] has attracted a vast
amount of attention over the last decade. In a Gallup Poll from 1999, more than half of
Americans polled believed that police actively engage in the practice of racial pro¯ling,
including 56 percent of whites surveyed and 77 percent of blacks surveyed. Moreover,
the same survey showed that 72 percent of black men between the ages of 18 and 34
believed they had been stopped because of race [Ramirez, McDevitt, and Farell, 2000].
These perceptions of widespread racial pro¯ling, and the view that treating individuals
di®erently based on their race is unethical and unconstitutional, have led to numerous
e®orts to implement policies that would eradicate racial pro¯ling by law enforcement
o±cers.1
If racially unequal behavior by law enforcement o±cers were soley the result of racial
bias, then ethical concerns undoubtedly justify the imposition of such anti-pro¯ling poli-
cies. However, racial pro¯ling could also result from a form of statistical discrimination,
where racially unbiased law enforcement o±cers use race as a signal of other unobserv-
able traits that relate to criminal proclivity. While the ethics and constitutionality of
this type of discrimination are also questionable, such statistical discrimination type
behavior may persist because it is the most e±cient way for o±cers to maximize the
expected guilt rate among individuals they investigate or search. Hence, banning racial
pro¯ling may come at the cost of increasing the overall crime rate and/or increasing the
cost of crime control.
This paper looks at this cost theoretically, describing how the overall crime rate may
be a®ected by enforcing colorblind police behavior. In doing so, I ¯rst devise a model of
law enforcement and individual behavior showing how and why statistical discrimination
may arise in equilibrium. This model is similar to those used for examining statistical
discrimination in the context of the labor market, most notably Coate and Loury [1993].
In the model used here, individuals decide whether or not to commit a particular crime
based on the bene¯ts they incur from doing so, the cost to getting caught for doing
1More than twenty states have passed legislation prohibiting racial pro¯ling and/or requiring juris-
dictions within the state to collect data on law enforcement stops and searches [Racial Pro¯ling Data
Collection Resource Center, 2003].
2so, and their belief concerning the probability they will be caught for doing so. A law
enforcement o±cer on the other hand, decides on a case by case basis whether or not
to investigate each individual he observes based on an endogenous guilt signal emitted
by the individual, the o±cer's belief regarding the overall guilt rate of the individual's
racial group, the bene¯t the o±cer incurs from a successful investigation, and the cost
to performing an investigation.
In equilibrium, all beliefs correspond to the truth and the optimal strategy for unbi-
ased o±cers is to treat observationally similar members of two racial groups di®erently
as long as one of the groups has a higher proportion of individuals who can be classi¯ed
as \at risk" of committing the particular relevant crime. While this result in and of
itself is relatively unsurprising, the model also shows that if statistical discrimination
is the cause of racially unequal investigation rates, then it must be the case that the
more frequently investigated race has a higher overall guilt rate than the other race,
while the guilt rate for investigated members of the more frequently investigated race
can be greater than, equal to, or less than the guilt rate for the investigated members
of the other race. Both of these results are in direct contrast to the previous work that
has attempted to examine statistical discrimination in the context of racial pro¯ling
in policing [Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 2001; Persico, 2002; Hernandez-Murillo and
Knowles, 2003]. Moreover, because of these results, this paper reveals that in order to
identify whether racially unequal investigation rates can be due to statistical discrim-
ination rather than racial bias among law enforcement o±cers, it is necessary to have
data regarding the overall guilt rate of each group, not just the guilt rate among the
investigated members of each racial group (the only data that is currently available).
After describing the equilibrium when unconstrained law enforcement o±cer behav-
ior results in statistical discrimination, I derive the equilibrium that would arise if a
theoretical policy were implemented such that o±cers are constrained to behave in a
perfectly colorblind manner. I show that the degree to which such a colorblind policy
alters the crime rate will depend on the relevant crime in question and characteristics
of the relevant jurisdiction. In general, if a group b has a higher fraction of individuals
who are at risk of committing the relevant crime than group a, then a colorblind policy
will lead to smaller increases (or possibly even decreases) in the overall crime rate (i) the
smaller the proportion of the jurisdiction that is made up of group b, (ii) the more equal
3the two groups are in terms of their relative fractions of individuals who are at risk of
committing the relevant crime, (iii) the smaller the proportion of the relevant popula-
tion o±cers are able to observe, (iv) the smaller the penalty associated with the relevant
crime, and (v) the smaller the proportion of individuals who incur a large bene¯t from
committing the relevant crime relative to those who only incur a small bene¯t.
Finally, I discuss the results of this model in two contexts relevant for racial pro¯ling|
motor vehicle searches by highway patrol and investigation of foreign nationals by border
patrol o±cers at U.S. airports and highways. The model suggests that the crime rate
cost to a colorblind policy is likely to be quite small (and possibly even negative) with
respect to highway motor vehicle searches, but may be substantially larger with respect
to investigation of foreigners coming into a country such as the United States.
2 Previous Literature
Despite the fact that economists have long examined statistical discrimination in the
context of labor markets [Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aiger and Cain, 1977; Lundberg
and Startz, 1983; Coate and Loury, 1993; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Moro and Norman,
2003], economists have just begun applying such thinking to racial inequality in other
areas, such as police searches. Currently, there exist only a handful papers in this area,
namely Farmer and Terrell [2001], Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001], Persico [2002],
and Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles, [2003]. Since these latter three papers all use
similar underlying models to obtain their results, I will subsequently refer to these three
papers as \KPT and the related papers," since Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001] was
the ¯rst of these to appear in print.
KPT and the related papers all essentially focus on the Nash equilibrium of a simul-
taneous move game, where police decide what proportion of each group to investigate
in order to maximize the guilt rate among the investigated, and members of each group
decide whether or not to commit the relevant crime (i.e. carry contraband) based on
whether the bene¯t to doing so exceeds the expected cost. In Persico [2002], only race is
observable by police, meaning groups simply refer to racial groups. In Knowles, Persico,
and Todd [2001] and Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles [2003] however, police can also
observe other exogenous characteristics besides race, meaning groups are made up of
4all individuals with similar race/characteristic combinations. In what follows, I will use
\groups" to refer to the more general race/characteristic combinations, but the discus-
sion would generally be the same using the more restrictive de¯nition used in Persico
[2002].2
The equilibrium that results from the environment proposed by KPT and the re-
lated papers is one in which police employ investigation rates (possibly di®ering) over
each group such that, given these investigation rates, the fraction of each group that
chooses to carry contraband (i.e. the \guilt rate" for each group) is equal across all
groups and is such that police are indi®erent between investigating and not investigat-
ing members of each group. Such behavior can be maintained in equilibrium because
police are indi®erent between investigating and not investigating members from each
group, meaning any search rate between zero and one will be weakly optimal from the
police o±cers' perspective. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique, because if any group
had a crime rate higher than the rate at which police o±cers were indi®erent between
investigating and not investigating, then police would investigate all members of this
group with probability one, and the construction of the model is such that, with an
investigation probability of one, it would not be optimal for any members of this group
to carry contraband. Hence, such a situation cannot be maintained as an equilibrium in
this environment. A similar argument can be made for a situation where one group had
a lower crime rate than that which makes police o±cers indi®erent between investigating
and not investigating.
This equilibrium implies that unequal investigation rates across races are consistent
with racially unbiased o±cers as long as, for any given observable characteristics, mem-
bers of one race generally incur higher bene¯ts to carrying contraband (or incur lower
costs of arrest) than the other. With such an assumption, o±cers have to investigate
groups containing members of the more crime prone race at higher rates in order to
make it optimal for all groups to carry contraband at the same equilibrium rate. This
implies that, in equilibrium, a higher fraction of the more crime prone race will be inves-
tigated. Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001] (as well as Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles
2Furthermore, in KPT and the related papers, police simply decide whether or not to search indi-
viduals. In this paper, I use the more general term \investigate," where a search is assumed to be the
type of investigation relevant to highway patrol o±cers.
5[2003]) use this equilibrium to motivate a \test" for whether or not observed racially
unequal search rates in particular highway stretches are due to statistical discrimination
or racial bias among state troopers. In particular, they claim that unequal search rates
across racial groups are consistent with unbiased o±cers as long as guilt rates among the
searched are equal across races (as required by their equilibrium with unbiased o±cers).
If guilt rates di®er across racial groups, then Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001] argue
that o±cers must be biased against the race with the lower guilt rate, regardless of which
race is searched at a higher rate. Persico [2002] also uses the equilibrium result that
guilt rates must be equal across all searched groups when proving his lemmas regarding
how a policy that makes search rates more racially fair will a®ect the overall crime rate.
While these papers provide an important starting point for thinking rigorously about
statistical discrimination in the context of policing, the equilibria discussed in these
papers lead to some unappealing results for this context. First, since each group has
the same guilt rate in equilibrium, police choose who to investigate at random. Not
only is this behavior generally illegal in many real world contexts,3 but it is also quite
unrealistic, as it means that the guilt rate among those investigated should equal the
guilt rate among those who are not investigated. In practice, this implies that o±cers'
experiences do not make them any better at spotting law-breakers than a machine that
picks individuals at random.
Second, and maybe even more importantly, the implicit beliefs necessary to main-
tain this equilibrium make the resulting behavior di±cult to reconcile with o±cers being
racially unbiased. Speci¯cally, as discussed above, in order to maintain the necessary
equilibrium investigation rates, o±cers must be indi®erent between investigating and
not investigating members of each group. This implicitly assumes that o±cers believe
each racial group has equal guilt rates, making o±cers indi®erent between investigat-
ing members of di®erent races with respect to maximizing the guilt rate among the
investigated. Given each o±cer is indi®erent between which race to search in terms
of maximizing successful investigation rates, it seems problematic to focus on an equi-
librium where unbiased o±cers still choose to systematically investigate one race at a
3For example, before conducting a search, New Jersey State Troopers must \be prepared to point to
speci¯c facts and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those known facts to support the
suspicion that this particular individual may be carrying a concealed weapon." [Verniero and Zoubek,
1999]
6higher rate than the other, as such behavior can be argued to only be consistent with
racial bias.4
In addition to these unappealing outcomes, the equilibrium and all the results com-
ing from KPT and the related papers hinge on the fact that law enforcement o±cers
will never ¯nd it optimal to investigate a particular group (i.e. all individuals with
a particular race/characteristics combination) with probability one in equilibrium. As
mentioned above, the reason this is true is because in these models, if o±cers investigate
a particular group with probability one, every member of that group carrying contra-
band would be caught. Therefore, no member of that group would ¯nd it optimal to
carry contraband, making it not optimal for police to use the strategy of investigating
that group with probability one.
However, this necessary assumption that police never ¯nd it optimal to investigate
any groups with probability one in equilibrium requires two rather strong implicit as-
sumptions. First, it requires that police can observe or come in contact with every
member of each group, so that when police choose to search members of a particular
group with probability one, they will actually search every member of that particular
group. To see why this implicit assumption is necessary, say law enforcement o±cers
could only observe a small fraction of the population. If this was the case, then even if
o±cers decide to investigate members of a particular group they observe with probability
one, many individuals in that group may still ¯nd it optimal to carry contraband since
there is a high probability they will not be observed, and therefore not investigated.
Since a signi¯cant fraction of this group still chooses to carry contraband even if they
know they will be investigated with probability one if they are observed, o±cers may still
¯nd it optimal to investigate every member of this group they observe with probability
one. Since in many jurisdictions where racial pro¯ling has become an issue (highways,
stores) o±cers are unlikely to be able to observe every individual, this assumption may
be problematic.
Second, for it to be true that police never investigate one group with probability
one in equilibrium, all observed characteristics must be exogenous and deterministic.
4To state this point another way, say o±cers are de¯ned to be racially unbiased only if they use
similar investigate rates across races when they believe races to be equally likely of being guilty. Under
this de¯nition of unbiasedness, it is not possible for the equilibrium coming out of KPT to be maintained
with racially unbiased o±cers.
7To see why this is true, say characteristics arose endogenously, meaning an individual
obtains a particular characteristic only if he is guilty of committing the relevant crime.
Then, it will always be the case that o±cers investigate individuals with this character-
istic with probability one. More generally, say relevant characteristics are endogenously
probabilistic, meaning the probability that an individual exhibits a certain characteris-
tic depends probabilistically on whether or not the individual is guilty of the relevant
crime. In this case, even if individuals believe that if they exhibit a certain characteristic
they will be investigated with probability one, a certain proportion of individuals who
exhibit that characteristic may still be found to be guilty because they believed there to
be some probability they would not exhibit that particular characteristic. Hence, police
still might ¯nd it optimal to investigate every individual with that particular character-
istic, as they still might ¯nd enough guilty individuals with that characteristic to make
such a strategy optimal.
Generally, other than race, age, and gender, most characteristics relevant to police
search behavior can be argued to be endogenously probabilistic. For example, in the case
of motor vehicle searches, if there is a strong odor of marijuana smoke in a car, an o±cer
will almost surely search the car. However, an individual smoking marijuana in the car
may believe that if he rolls down the windows and sprays air freshener, a police o±cer
might not smell the marijuana smoke. Hence, a strategy of searching every car that has a
strong odor of marijuana may not deter all drivers from carrying or smoking marijuana
in their car. A similar case could be made for drivers who are erratic, disoriented,
visibly nervous, have prior records, or have visible contraband related materials (e.g.
drug paraphernalia, empty beer cans, bullets, etc.).
The model presented in the next section proposes an environment where law en-
forcement o±cers can only investigate individuals they observe, and it is possible that
they cannot observe all individuals. Furthermore, in addition to race, police can observe
a characteristic that arises endogenously, where some realizations of this characteristic
are more likely for individuals who committed the relevant crime. As will be shown, the
equilibrium that arises in this environment results in several important di®erences from
the equilibrium that arose in KPT and the related papers. In particular, the optimal po-
lice strategy is e®ective in the sense that the guilt rate among the investigated is higher
than in the population at large, and unbiased police o±cers treat observationally equiv-
8alent individuals from di®erent races di®erently only if it is a strictly dominant strategy
to do so. This will be shown to have important consequences with respect to whether the
tests used by Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001] and Knowles and Hernandez-Murillo
[2003] are valid for determining whether what racially unequal investigation rates in a
particular jurisdiction are due to racial bias or statistical discrimination.
Moreover, I will also use the model proposed below to characterize how implement-
ing a colorblind policy will a®ect the overall crime rate. In this way, this paper is similar
to Farmer and Terrell [2001] and Persico [2002]. However, this model di®ers from these
papers not only in its °exibility,5 but also in its ability to describe how a variety of di®er-
ent jurisdictional characteristics may a®ect how the crime rate responds to a colorblind
policing policy.6
3 Model of Racially Unequal Search Rates with Unbiased
O±cers
In developing this model, I ¯rst describe individual behavior, then police behavior, and
¯nally I characterize the equilibrium.
3.1 Individual Behavior
In the relevant population/jurisdiction, let there be a continuum of individuals, where
individuals can be divided into two racial groups, a and b, with a fraction ¯ of the pop-
ulation being from race b.7 Within each race, assume there are two types of individuals,
5For example, this model allows law enforcement o±cers to observe endogenously determined char-
acteristics related to guilt (something not allowed in Persico [2002]), allows for deterrence (something
not allowed for in Farmer and Terrell [2001]), and allows for the possibility that police cannot observe,
and therefore cannot arrest, all individuals (something not allowed for in either of the previous papers).
6In Farmer and Terrell [2001], there are no parameters that can di®er across jurisdictions. In Persico
[2002], only the relative di®erences in the wealth distributions across races (implicitly the distributions
of bene¯ts to committing the relevant crime) can di®er across jurisdictions.
7Note that \race" can actually be any directly observable exogenous characteristic, meaning any
characteristic where the realization of this characteristic does not depend on whether or not an individual
is guilty of committing the relevant crime and can be observed by a law enforcement o±cer with minimal
e®ort. For example, age groups, gender groups, or race/gender/age group combinations can substitute
for racial groups without loss of generality.
9those individuals who are \at risk" for choosing to commit a particular relevant crime,
and those who are \not at risk" for choosing to commit the relevant crime.8 Denoting
the net utility bene¯t to person i from committing the crime as ²i, assume ²i = 0 for
all not at risk individuals. Alternatively, for at risk individuals, assume ²i is an i.i.d.
random variable drawn from a distribution G de¯ned over the support (0;²] (i.e. ²i > 0
for all at risk individuals).
Let the two racial groups di®er in that a fraction ¸a of race a are at risk individuals,
while ¸b of race b are at risk individuals, with ¸a < ¸b. There are a variety of reasons
why one racial group may have a higher fraction of at risk individuals than the other.
For example, if the opportunity cost of arrest is prohibitively high for high-income
individuals, then ¸a < ¸b will result if race a has a signi¯cantly higher proportion of
high-income individuals than race b. Alternatively, ¸a < ¸b may arise if race b has a
higher fraction of young people than race a, and the utility bene¯t to committing the
relevant crime is negligible for everyone after reaching a certain age. Or, there may be
other more complicated mechanisms, such as race speci¯c gangs or racial di®erences in
religious beliefs, that account for racial di®erences in the fraction of each race that are
at risk of participating in some particular criminal behavior. Clearly, whether or not it
is reasonable to assume ¸a < ¸b depends on the speci¯c context in question.9
Next, assume that the utility cost to getting arrested for the criminal activity is
equal to c for all individuals, and that each individual knows that if he is guilty of
committing the crime he will be arrested if and only if a law enforcement o±cer chooses
to investigate him.10 However, each individual also knows that law enforcement o±cers
can only investigate an individuals who they come in contact with, which is a fraction
8The particular relevant crime will depend on the jurisdiction in question. For example, if the
relevant jurisdiction is the highway system, then the relevant crime is carrying contraband such as
drugs, alcohol or weapons. Alternatively, if the relevant jurisdiction is a store, then the relevant crime is
possessing shoplifted material, or if the relevant jurisdiction is border crossings, the relevant crime may
be supporting or planning terrorist activity.
9Note that Persico's [2002] assumption that the bene¯ts to crime are directly related to income, and
the distribution of income di®ers across races, is just a special case of the assumption used here as
discussed in the example given above.
10In the context of the highway patrol, an \investigation" is a motor vehicle or person search. In
the broader sense however, an investigation could refer to everything from a security o±cer following a
customer around a store, to an FBI or INS investigation of an individual for terrorist connections.
10´ of the total population.11 Moreover, an individual of race j believes that if he is
guilty of committing the crime and is observed by a law enforcement o±cer he will be
investigated with probability b pg;j.12
Given this setup, an individual from race j will choose to commit the crime as long
as his bene¯t from doing so exceeds the expected cost of doing so. More explicitly, an
individual i will commit the crime when ²i > ´b pg;jc. Therefore, the proportion of at risk
individuals from race j who choose to commit the relevant crime equals 1 ¡ G(´b pg;jc).
This implies that the overall proportion of race j that is guilty of committing the crime
is given by
¼(¸j; b pg;j) = ¸j[1 ¡ G(´b pg;jc)] (1)
Not surprisingly, this expression for ¼(¸j; b pg;j) implies that the proportion of a race
that is guilty of committing the relevant crime increases with the fraction of the race
that are at risk (i.e. ¸j), and decreases with the believed probability of search given an
individual is observed by police and is guilty of the relevant crime (i.e. b pg;j).
Finally, for the sake of completeness, assume G(0) = 0 and G(c) > 0. This simply
assumes that all at risk individuals will commit the crime if they believe there is zero
probability of being caught, and the utility cost of arrest is high enough such that at
least some (and possibly all) of the at risk individuals will choose not to commit the
relevant crime if they think that they will be caught with probability one.
3.2 Law Enforcement O±cer Behavior
Recall that law enforcement o±cers can observe only a fraction ´ of all individuals in
their jurisdiction. For each individual they do observe, they must decide whether or
not to investigate the individual. If they choose to investigate an individual, they will
arrest a guilty individual with probability one. The cost to investigating an individual
is equal to q, while the bene¯t to arresting a guilty individual is denoted v, where v > q.
11For example, in the context of highway patrol, ´ is the fraction of all cars on the highway that one
o±cer can observe. Similarly, in a department store, it is the fraction of all customers that a security
o±cer can observe.
12As will be discussed in section 3.3, in equilibrium, this belief must correspond to the true probability
a guilty individual from race j will be searched given he is observed by police.
11If we assume that law enforcement o±cers are simply agents of society, then v can be
interpreted as the bene¯t to society for apprehending an individual who is guilty of the
relevant crime and q can be interpreted as the societal cost to investigating an individual.
When observing an individual, law enforcement o±cers can observe the individual's
race and as well as a guilt signal denoted µ 2 [0;1], where this signal is some char-
acteristic of the individual that may be in°uenced by whether the individual is guilty
(e.g. nervousness, clothing style/colors, driving patterns, unusual odors, etc.). Similar
to Coate and Loury [1993], let µ be a random variable realized after the individual has
decided whether or not to commit the crime, where the distribution of µ depends on
whether or not the individual is guilty. Let Fg(µ) be the probability the signal does
not exceed µ given that the individual is guilty of committing the crime, and Fn(µ) be
the probability the signal does not exceed µ given that the individual is not guilty of
committing the crime. Denoting the corresponding density functions as fg(µ) and fn(µ),
the likelihood ratio at µ will equal
fn(µ)
fg(µ). Assume that this likelihood ratio is decreasing
on [0,1], implying Fg(µ) · Fn(µ) for all possible µ. Hence, higher values of the signal
are more likely for guilty individuals.
As stated above, law enforcement o±cers can also distinguish the race of each indi-
vidual they observe. This is important as law enforcement o±cers may have di®erent
beliefs concerning the proportion of each race that is guilty. Speci¯cally, let these beliefs
concerning race j be denoted b ¼j.13
Using Bayes' Rule, a law enforcement o±cer's posterior beliefs concerning the prob-
ability that an observed individual from race j who emits a signal µ is guilty will equal
»(b ¼j;µ) =
b ¼jfg(µ)
b ¼jfg(µ) + (1 ¡ b ¼j)fn(µ)
:
Re-writing the above equation in a more convenient form we get,
»(b ¼j;µ) =
b ¼j




Because the likelihood ratio (
fn(µ)
fg(µ)) was assumed to be decreasing in µ, taking deriva-
tives of equation (2) will show that
@»(b ¼j;µ)
@µ > 0 and
@»(b ¼j;µ)
@b ¼j > 0. In other words, the
13Once again, as will be discussed in section 3.3., these beliefs will correspond to the true proportion
of each racial group that is carrying contraband in equilibrium.
12posterior belief of guilt is increasing in the signal, and for any given signal, the posterior
belief of guilt is greater the greater the prior belief of guilt. Moreover, »(1;µ) = 1 and
»(0;µ) = 0 for all µ, meaning if o±cers believe all members of race j are guilty of the
relevant crime, or believe no members of race j are guilty of the relevant crime, then
the observed guilt signal does not in°uence the o±cers' posterior beliefs.
Given this setup, a law enforcement o±cer will investigate an observed individual of
race j if and only if the individual emits a signal such that »(b ¼j;µ)v > q, or only if
b ¼j







We can now de¯ne a threshold level µ¤(b ¼j), such that for any belief b ¼j, equation (3)
holds if and only if µ > µ¤(b ¼j), where µ¤(b ¼j) = 0 if b ¼j is such that equation (3) holds for
all µ, µ¤(b ¼j) = 1 if b ¼j is such that equation (3) never holds for any µ, and µ¤(b ¼j) equals
the value of µ that causes (3) to hold at equality if possible.
Because
fn(µ)
fg(µ) was assumed to be non-increasing in µ, it can be easily con¯rmed that
when µ¤(b ¼j) is between 0 and 1, it is strictly decreasing in b ¼j, or the greater the prior
belief of guilt, the lower the signal necessary for investigation.
Given this search strategy, the probability a guilty individual from race j is arrested
equals the probability he is observed, ´, times the probability he will be investigated if
observed, which equals
pg(b ¼j) = [1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(b ¼j))]: (4)
Finally, note that we can easily incorporate racial bias among law enforcement o±cers
against race b into this model by allowing v (the bene¯t to a successful search) to be
greater for race b than race a (or by allowing the cost to searching q to be lower for
race a than race b). Equation (3) shows that the e®ect of such a bias on police behavior
would be to further lower µ¤(b ¼b) relative to µ¤(b ¼a), which in turn would increase pg(b ¼b)
relative to pg(b ¼a), all else equal.
3.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each individuals' beliefs concerning the probability of being
investigated given he is guilty and observed by a law enforcement o±cer corresponds to
13the true probability of being investigated given he is guilty and observed by an o±cer,
and when law enforcement o±cers' beliefs concerning the proportion of each race that
are guilty of committing the relevant crime correspond to the truth. In other words,
equilibrium is a pair of beliefs fb pg;j;b ¼jg for each race j that simultaneously satisfy
b ¼j = ¼(¸j; b pg;j) and b pg;j = pg(b ¼j), where ¼(¸j; b pg;j) is de¯ned in equation (1) and pg(b ¼j)
is de¯ned in equation (4). The Appendix proves that for any ¸j, there exists a unique
equilibrium pair of beliefs fb pg;j;b ¼jg. Denote this equilibrium pair as fpe
g;j;¼e
jg. In the
discussion to follow, unless otherwise stated, the equilibrium is assumed to be one in
which o±cers are racially unbiased (i.e. v and q are the same for both races).
The ¯rst thing to note about this equilibrium is that if ¸b > ¸a, then ¼e
b > ¼e
a.14 In
other words, if one race has as higher proportion of at risk individuals than the other,
then in equilibrium, the more at risk racial group will also have a higher proportion
of actual law-breakers than the other racial group. While this result is quite intuitive,
it is worth noting that this result is in direct contrast to the statistical discrimination
equilibrium in KPT and the related papers. As discussed in Section 2, the key aspect
of their equilibrium is that even if one race has a higher average bene¯t to carrying
contraband than the other (which is analogous to a higher fraction of at risk individu-
als), in equilibrium, both races will still choose to carry contraband at the same rate,
which in turn causes police to be indi®erent between searching any two individuals of
di®erent races. In the equilibrium of the model presented here, police are only indif-
ferent between investigating (or searching in the context of highway patrol o±cers) the
marginal members of each race, where the marginal member of race j is de¯ned to be
an individual who emits a guilt signal equal to the race speci¯c threshold level µ¤(¼e
j).
If we restrict our attention to parameterizations where µ¤(¼e
b) > 0 and/or where
µ¤(¼e
a) < 1,15 then because ¸b > ¸a implies ¼e
b > ¼e
a, we also know that µ¤(¼e
b) < µ¤(¼e
a).
In other words, if race b has a higher proportion of at risk individuals than race a,
then not only will race b have a higher equilibrium guilt rate than race a, but also
unbiased o±cers will set a lower signal threshold necessary for investigating members
of race b than race a. This is how statistical discrimination manifests itself in this
14See Appendix for proof of this assertion.
15In other words, assume that ¼
e
b is low enough such that police do not investigate all individuals from
group b that they observe and/or ¼
e
w is high enough such that police have at least a positive probability
of investigating an individual from group w.
14model. In particular, unequal equilibrium crime rates mean it is strictly optimal for
unbiased o±cers to treat some observationally similar individuals from di®erent races
di®erently (i.e. individuals who emit a guilt signal between µ¤(¼e
b) and µ¤(¼e
w) will only
be investigated if they are from group b).
This result is important because it implies that for any particular o±cer, even if this
o±cer is not racially biased, maintaining statistical discriminatory behavior is strictly
preferred to any other strategy. For example, if a particular o±cer chose not to behave in
a discriminatory manner, and raised the signal threshold for members of race b (and/or
lowered the signal threshold for members of race a), he would ¯nd that he was not
investigating individuals over which he had a positive expected value of investigating
(and/or would be investigating individuals over which he had a negative expected value
of investigating). Hence, even if an o±cer gets a slight disutility from engaging in
statistical discrimination, according to this model he would still engage in such behavior
since it is strictly preferred to any other strategy. This is not true for the statistical
discrimination occurring in KPT and the related papers, as racially unequal search rates
are only weakly dominant strategies for unbiased o±cers in those papers.
Moreover, from equation (4) we can see that since µ¤(¼e
a) > µ¤(¼e
b), we know that
pe
g;a < pe
g;b. In words, the lower threshold guilt signal police use for group b causes the
probability that o±cers investigate a guilty member of race b to be greater than the
probability o±cers investigate a guilty member of race a. Furthermore, the probability
a not guilty member of race j is investigated in equilibrium will be ´pe
n;j, where
pe




a), the above expression implies that ´pe
n;b > ´pe
n;a, or that not guilty
members of race b will be more likely to be subjected to an investigation than not guilty
members of race a, even if o±cers are racially unbiased.
The next thing to note is that we can write out the overall equilibrium crime rate
for the particular crime relevant to the jurisdiction in question as
¦e = ¯¸b[1 ¡ G(´pe
bc)] + (1 ¡ ¯)¸a[1 ¡ G(´pe
ac)]: (6)
Not surprisingly, the above expression shows that the overall crime rate is increasing in
the proportion of at risk individuals from each race (i.e. ¸a and ¸b). Moreover, because
15¼e
b > ¼e
a we know via the equilibrium requirements that 1 ¡ G(´pe
bc) > 1 ¡ G(´pe
ac).
Combining this with the assumption that ¸b > ¸a, equation (6) implies that the overall
crime rate is increasing in the proportion of the population from race b (i.e. ¯). Also,
note that the overall crime rate is decreasing in the probability the individual will be
observed by a law enforcement o±cer (i.e. ´) and in the cost of being arrested (i.e. c).
The intuition for all of these results is quite straightforward.
Furthermore, let ½(¼e
j) denote the equilibrium investigation rate for race j, meaning
½(¼e
j) = ´[1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
j))]¼e
j + ´[1 ¡ Fn(µ¤(¼e
j))](1 ¡ ¼e
j);
where the ¯rst term is the fraction of guilty race j individuals who are observed by
police and emit a guilt signal high enough to warrant a search, and the second term
is the fraction of not-guilty race j individuals are observed by police and emit a guilt
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j · 0 and [1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
j))] > [1 ¡ Fn(µ¤(¼e
j))], the above derivative will be
strictly positive. In other words, if police are not racially biased, then this model implies
that race b can be investigated at a higher rate than race a if and only if race b has
a higher equilibrium guilt rate than race a (i.e. only if ¼e
b > ¼e
a). In principle, this
implication means that we could \test" whether racially unequal investigation rates in
a particular jurisdiction are due to racially biased o±cers or statistical discrimination,
similar to what was done in Knowles, Persico, and Todd [2001]. Speci¯cally, if there
existed data on the overall guilt rates for each racial group in a jurisdiction, statisti-
cal discrimination could be a contributing factor for racially unequal investigation rates
between races a and b only if race b has a higher overall guilt rate than race a. Alter-
natively, if race b is investigated at a higher rate than race a, but the overall guilt rate
among race a is greater than or equal to the overall guilt rate among race b, it must
be the case that v=q is smaller for group a than group b, implying o±cers are racially
biased against group b.16
16To see why this is true, recall from equation (3) that a lower v=q means a higher µ
¤(b ¼j), for any
16However, the primary constraint inherent in this \test" is that accurate data re-
garding the underlying guilt rates for each race as a whole in a jurisdiction would be
di±cult, if not impossible to obtain. Rather, most available data can only reveal the
equilibrium guilt rate among the investigated members of each race (since these are the
only ones for whom police can identify whether they are guilty or not). This issue was
not raised in KPT, since in their equilibrium police chose who to investigate at random,
meaning the overall guilt rate for each race equals the guilt rate among the investigated
for each race. However, this model reveals the importance of this issue. Speci¯cally, the
equilibrium guilt rate among the investigated can be denoted °(¼e












It is straightforward to show that because Fn(µ) > Fg(µ) for all µ, °(¼e
j) as de¯ned
in the above expression exceeds ¼e
j. In other words, because police selectively choose
which observed individuals to investigate on the basis of their guilt signals, the guilt
rate among the investigated from each race will be greater than the guilt rate among
that race as a whole.
Furthermore, equation (7) can be used to show that the guilt rate among the inves-
tigated from each race will generally not be su±cient for determining whether or not
racially unequal investigation rates in a jurisdiction can be due to statistical rather than
racial bias among law enforcement o±cers. Speci¯cally, even with with ¼e
b > ¼e
a (i.e.
the necessary condition for unequal search rates to be due to statistical discrimination)
°(¼e
b) can be greater than, equal to, or less than °(¼e
a). This result implies that Knowles,
Persico, and Todd's [2001] \test" for determining whether unequal investigation rates
are due to police o±cer racial bias or statistical discrimination is not necessarily valid.
As discussed in the previously, they argue that if guilt rates among the investigated
are not equal across races, then police o±cers must be biased against the race with the
lower guilt rate. To put it another way, they argue that racially unequal investigation
rates are consistent with unbiased police o±cers as long as the guilt rates among the
investigated are equal across races. However, equation (7) reveals that guilt rates among




b, it can still be










b), or race b to be investigated at
a higher rate even though they have a lower crime rate.
17the investigated are not necessarily equalized across races, even with racially unbiased
police o±cers.
Moreover, as will be shown below, rather stringent conditions must be met (although
even these conditions are not su±cient) for racially unequal investigation rates to co-
exist with racially equal guilt rates among the investigated, if law enforcement o±cers
are truly racially unbiased. Speci¯cally, from equation (7), the guilt rate among the
investigated individuals from race b (i.e. °(¼e




























a , meaning a necessary condition for the above expression











Now, de¯ne ~ µ to be the value of µ such that fg(~ µ) = fn(~ µ).17 Given this de¯nition
and the fact that
fn
fq is decreasing on (0;1), it will also be true that
[1¡Fn(µ)]
[1¡Fg(µ)] reaches
a minimum at µ = ~ µ, is decreasing in µ for µ < ~ µ, and is increasing in µ for µ > ~ µ.
Therefore, since ¼e
a < ¼e
b, we know µ¤(¼e
a) > µ¤(¼e
b), meaning equation (8) can only hold
if µ¤(¼e
b) < ~ µ. In other words, the guilt rate among investigated members of race a (i.e.
°(¼e
a)) can be greater than or equal to the guilt rate among the investigated members
of race b (i.e. °(¼e
b)) only if it is optimal for law enforcement o±cers to set a relatively
low signal threshold individuals from race b must surpass in order to be investigated.
A relatively low signal threshold for race b not only implies that a relatively high
proportion of race b individuals would be investigated, but also, recalling how µ¤(¼)
was de¯ned in equation (3), µ¤(¼e
b) can be relatively low only if ¼e
b is relatively large
and/or q is small compared to v. Hence, for it to even be possible for the guilt rate
for investigated members of race a to be equal to or greater than the guilt rate for
investigated members of race b, a relatively high fraction of race b must be investigated,
the actual guilt rate among race b must be relatively high, and/or the bene¯t o±cers
17We know such a ~ µ exists and is unique since
fn
fq was assumed to be decreasing on (0;1) and that
both fn and fg are pdfs.
18incur from a successful investigation must be relatively high in comparison to the cost
of investigating an individual.
While it is di±cult to determine the size of the bene¯t o±cers incur from a successful
investigation relative to the cost of an investigation, the available data suggests the other
two conditions are relatively unlikely to hold. For example, in Missouri, only 11.5 percent
of non-white motorists who were stopped were actually searched (the relevant type of
investigation in the context of motorists on highways) [Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles,
2003].18 Similarly, only about 9.5 percent and 22 percent of non-white motorists who
were stopped were searched by Rhode Island State Troopers [Farrell et al., 2003] and the
Los Angeles Police Department [Los Angeles Police Department, 2002] respectively.19
Also, the guilt rates among searched non-white motorists in Missouri, Rhode Island, and
Los Angeles, were 15.6 percent, 13.9 percent, and 29.4 percent respectively.20 Recalling
that guilt rates among the investigated are likely to be higher than the guilt rate for the
race as a whole, these ¯ndings suggest that guilt rates among non-white motorists are
relatively low. Therefore, it is unlikely that in these localities where guilt rates among
searched minority and white motorists are equal, the unequal search rates across races
were due soley to statistical discrimination.
4 Analysis of the Theoretical Costs to Banning Pro¯ling
As discussed in the introduction, while many people may ethically object to police us-
ing race as a factor in deciding who to search regardless of the underlying motivation,
eradicating such behavior may have costs in terms of increasing overall crime rates.
This section uses the model developed in Section 3 to analyze how these costs to an
anti-pro¯ling policy may di®er by characteristics of the relevant jurisdiction and crime.
Generally, the analysis presented below assumes o±cers to be racially unbiased. How-
ever, recall that in this model, if o±cers are racially biased, then v is bigger for group b
than group a (or q is smaller for group a than group b). As discussed above, the only
18This compares to only 6.4 percent of white drivers who were stopped were searched.
19The analogous search rates for white drivers were 4.3 percent in Rhode Island and 6.6 percent in
Los Angeles.
20The analogous guilt rates for white drivers who were searched were 23.7 percent in Missouri, 14.8
percent in Rhode Island, and 28.7 percent in Los Angeles.
19thing that changes due to this bias is that µ¤(¼e
b) will be lower for any ¼e
b or µ¤(¼e
a) will
be higher for any ¼e
a. As can be con¯rmed below, the basic implications that follow will
not be changed by allowing o±cers to have such racial biases.
4.1 Implementing a Perfect Colorblind Policing Policy
Let us assume that it is theoretically possible to implement a perfect anti-pro¯ling policy
such that police o±cers could not use an individual's racial group in any part of their
investigation decision. In other words, assume the policy could make police o±cers
perfectly colorblind. With this policy, o±cers e®ectively only observe one race, and
therefore cannot employ race speci¯c beliefs. Rather, police must use only one belief
concerning the average guilt rate among the whole population, b ¦. Given this belief, in
the same manner as in Section 3, o±cers will choose a threshold level µ¤(b ¦), such that
they will investigate an observed individual only if they observe a guilt signal greater
than µ¤(b ¦), where µ¤(b ¦) is derived analogously to before. Therefore, for individuals of
both races, the probability of being investigated if guilty equals ´pg(b ¦), where
pg(b ¦) = 1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(b ¦)): (9)
From the individual's perspective, the problem does not change. Speci¯cally, an
individual of race j chooses to commit the relevant crime only if ² ¸ ´b pg;jc. This means
the proportion of the total population choosing to commit the crime will equal
¦(¸b;¸a; b pg;b; b pg;a;) = ¯¸b[1 ¡ G(´b pg;bc)] + (1 ¡ ¯)¸a[1 ¡ G(´b pg;ac)] (10)
Equilibrium now consists of a set of beliefs fb pg;a; b pg;b; b ¦g such that b pg;a = b pg;b = pg(b ¦)
(as described by equation 9) and b ¦ = ¦(¸b;¸a; b pg;b; b pg;a) (as described by equation
10). Using a similar argument as in the unconstrained case, we can prove such an
equilibrium exists and is unique.21 Denote this equilibrium set of beliefs in the colorblind
environment as f¦c;pc
gg.
The ¯rst thing to note about this new equilibrium is that if ¸a < ¸b, causing ¼e
a < ¼e
b
in the unconstrained equilibrium, then this new equilibrium will be such that ¼e
a < ¦c <
21See Appendix.
20¼e
b.22 A straightforward implication of this result is that µ¤(¼e
a) > µ¤(¦c) > µ¤(¼e
b),




g;b.23 In words, the implementation of a policy that causes police to behave
in a colorblind manner will increase the probability of search for guilty members from
race a, while decreasing the probability of search for guilty members from race b.
4.2 The E®ect of a Colorblind Policy on the Overall Crime Rate
By construction, this colorblind policy constrains police from using some available infor-
mation relevant to maximizing the success rate of their investigations. If society incurs
a cost for every individual who carries the relevant contraband, it is important to char-
acterize how constraining police in this manner will a®ect the overall crime rate. In the
context of this model, this question reduces to calculating ¦c¡¦e, where ¦c is described
by equation (10) and ¦e is described by equation (6). Writing this expression out and
re-arranging, we obtain
¦c ¡ ¦e = ¯¸b[G(´pe
g;bc) ¡ G(´pc






g;b, the term in the ¯rst set of brackets in the above expression
will be positive, while the term in the second set of brackets will be negative. Therefore,
the degree to which the policy increases the overall crime rate will depend on the relative
magnitude of the ¯rst product versus the second product in equation (11). Intuitively,
the ¯rst product is the degree to which the policy increases the number of group b
individuals committing the relevant crime, while the second product is the degree to
which the policy decreases the number of group a individuals committing the relevant
crime.24
22Proof of this assertion can be found in Appendix. Note that this will be true even if law enforcement
o±cers are racially biased, as racial bias just further exacerbates the discrimination that exists when
o±cers are unbiased.
23This result is straightforward from the fact that p
e














24Note that this condition is somewhat analogous to Persico's [2002] condition regarding when a
racially \fair" (i.e. colorblind) policy can lead to less crime overall. Namely, the expression in equation
(11) is simply comparing the relative elasticities of each race to more and less intensive policing.
21The ¯rst thing to note about equation (11) is that it shows it is theoretically possible
for the overall crime rate to actually decrease following the implementation of a color-
blind policy, since the second product can theoretically be greater in absolute value than
the ¯rst product. This result emphasizes an important point, namely that the policy
that maximizes the number of criminals caught for any given number of investigations
performed may be quite di®erent than the policy which minimizes the overall number
of guilty individuals.
The second thing to note about equation (11) is that it implies that the increase in
the crime rate following the colorblind policy will be smaller the smaller the fraction
of the overall population that is from race b (i.e. the smaller the ¯). Furthermore,
equation (11) shows that the increase in the crime rate following the colorblind policy
will be smaller the smaller ¸b is compared to ¸a. In other words, the crime cost to a
colorblind policy will likely be smaller, the more similar the races are in terms of their
proportions of at risk individuals. One implication of this is that the crime cost to a
colorblind policy is likely to be smaller when the relevant racial groups have relatively
similar income, age, and gender distributions, as such similarities would likely cause ¸a
to approach ¸b.
The fourth thing revealed by equation (11) is that the increase in the crime rate
following the colorblind policy will generally be smaller the smaller is ´, or the smaller
the fraction of the overall population that police can observe. Speci¯cally, a smaller ´










Intuitively, if ´ is small, then law enforcement o±cers are only observing a small frac-
tion of the overall population, meaning that they are not having much of an e®ect on
individual criminal participation decisions in the ¯rst place. Therefore, constraining law
enforcement o±cer behavior a little bit will not have a large e®ect on individual behav-
ior. For analogous reasons, the increase in the crime rate following the colorblind policy
will also generally be smaller the smaller is c, or the smaller the penalty for getting
caught.
The ¯nal thing to note about equation (11) is that the cost of the colorblind policy
25However, this is not necessarily the case, as this result depends on the shape of the distribution of
bene¯ts to carrying contraband (i.e. the shape of G).
22will depend on the distribution of the bene¯ts to committing the relevant crime (i.e.
the G function). Speci¯cally, the crime rate cost to the policy will be smaller the more
concave the G function is between ´pe
g;ac and ´pe
g;bc (see the lower graph in Figure 1(i)
compared to the lower graph in Figure1 (ii)). This statement is equivalent to saying
that the crime rate cost to a colorblind policy will be smaller if the elasticity of at risk
individuals to greater search rates is decreasing in the search rate.
In the context of this model, the distribution of bene¯ts will be relatively concave
for crimes and/or jurisdictions where only a small fraction of at risk individuals obtain
a large bene¯t from committing the crime.26 This situation is depicted graphically in
example (i) in Figure 1. Examples may include crimes such as driving with possession of
small amounts of drugs or alcohol, or in possession of a ¯rearm, where most individuals
who would potentially engage in such behavior would only incur a small bene¯t from
doing so, while only a very few individuals would incur really large bene¯ts (e.g. drug
addicts, alcoholics, or those who need guns for protection). Hence, the elasticity of
potential violaters of these relatively minor crimes to greater search rates is likely to
decrease as search rates increase, meaning a colorblind policy targeting these types of
crimes will likely cause only small increases (or even a decreases) in these types of crimes,
all else equal.
Alternatively, the cumulative distribution of bene¯ts will generally not be concave
for crimes and/or jurisdictions where a substantial fraction of the at risk individuals
obtain a large bene¯t from committing the crime. This situation is depicted graphically
in example (ii) in Figure 1. Possible crimes of this type include transportation of large
amounts of drugs or ¯rearms for distribution and supporting terrorist activities, where
most individuals who bene¯t at all from these crimes incur very large bene¯ts. Therefore,
the elasticity of individuals at risk of committing these more serious crimes to greater
search rates is not likely to decrease as search rates increase, meaning a colorblind policy
targeting these types of crimes may cause large increases in these types of crimes, all
else equal.
It is also worth noting that the bene¯ts to this colorblind policy can be seen on
26This follows due to the fact that if only a few law-breakers obtain a large bene¯t from the relevant
crime, while the rest obtain smaller bene¯ts, the pdf of bene¯ts will generally be downward sloping,
thus implying the cdf will be generally concave.
23two fronts. First, the probability that an innocent member of race b is investigated
falls from 1 ¡ Fn(µ¤(¼e
b)) to 1 ¡ Fn(µ¤(¦e)).27 Second, the policy decreases the cross
race di®erence in the probability of investigation (given observation by law enforcement
o±cers) from Fn(µ¤(¼e
a)) ¡ Fn(µ¤(¼e
b)) to zero for innocent members of each race, and
Fg(µ¤(¼e
a)) ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
b)) to zero for guilty members of each race. The bene¯t of this
greater equality of treatment can certainly be argued to be very large for societies that
place a high valuation on racial equity and individual rights.
5 Implications of the Model in the Context of Particular
Examples
This section looks at how this model can help provide insights into how the e®ects of
colorblind policing policies on the crime rate can di®er across jurisdictions and/or law
enforcement institutions. Because none of the parameters in the following examples are
calibrated to equal any sort of estimated value, these examples are meant to be merely
instructive for showing how the relevant parameters may di®er across jurisdictions, and
how this will alter the e®ect of colorblind policies on the crime rate. In other words,
the results of this section are simply meant to suggest that, in some relevant types of
jurisdictions, the crime rate costs to a colorblind policy can actually be expected to be
very small, while in other types of jurisdictions, the magnitude of the crime rate costs
may be less clear cut.
5.1 Colorblind Policies and the Highway Patrol
With respect to highway motor vehicle searches, the model suggests the crime rate costs
to imposing a colorblind policy may be quite small. To see why, ¯rst note that since
the racial composition of motorists on highways is likely to generally re°ect the racial
composition of the population at large, minorities should generally make up a relatively
small proportion of the overall relevant population, meaning ¯ should be relatively low.
Second, the most relevant crimes for the majority of motor vehicle searches are possession
of a small quantity of drugs, alcohol, or a ¯rearm. Since the proportion of individuals
27However, the colorblind policy will have the o®setting e®ect of increasing the probability that an
innocent member of race a is investigated from 1 ¡ Fn(µ
¤(¼
e
a)) to 1 ¡ Fn(µ
¤(¦
e)).
24who are at risk of carrying drugs, alcohol, or ¯rearms is likely to be quite similar across
races, ¸a will likely be quite close to ¸b (where group b is black or latino motorists).
Third, highway troopers only observe a small fraction of drivers on a given highway,
meaning ´ will be quite low in this context. Fourth, for these relatively minor crimes,
the penalty c will also be quite small. Finally, as discussed above, for minor crimes
such as drug possession, very few at risk individuals are likely to incur large bene¯ts
from possessing the drugs while driving. Therefore, as argued previously, the bene¯t
distribution G is likely to be relatively concave for these crimes. From equation (11),
we can see that all ¯ve of these points suggest that colorblind policies implemented on
the highway patrol would likely have a relatively small e®ect on the overall crime rate
on highways.
5.2 Colorblind Policies and the Border Patrol
Alternatively, for investigations of incoming foreigners by border guards at airports
and highways, the magnitude of the e®ect of a colorblind policy on the relevant crime
rate is less clear. On the one hand, ¯ is likely to be quite small. For example, if the
relevant population is all foreign travellers entering the United States, individuals from
the middle-east (the race facing discrimination) make up only a small fraction of the
relevant population.28
On the other hand, the relevant crime in this context may be supporting terrorist
activity. While only a minuscule fraction of foreign nationals from any country are
likely to be at risk of supporting terrorist activities against United States citizens, this
fraction may be substantially larger for middle-easterners than foreigners from other
regions (e.g. South Americans, Europeans, Asians), meaning ¸b (where group b consists
of middle-easterners) will likely be substantially larger than ¸a (where group a consists of
individuals from other parts of the world). Furthermore, since the penalty to supporting
terrorist activity is likely to be large, c will also be large. Finally, in the group of foreign
entrants (from any foreign country) who would potentially support terrorist activities,
most would likely obtain very large bene¯ts from such activity, meaning the bene¯t
28However, this is certainly not necessarily the case. For example, if the relevant jurisdiction is Israel,
then the \race" facing discrimination is the arabs which likely make up a large fraction of incoming
foreigners at Israeli border crossings, meaning ¯ in this case would be quite large.
25distribution in this case would likely not be very concave. These latter points imply
that a colorblind policy can potentially have a large increased crime rate cost in the
case of investigations of foreign nationals by border guards.
Finally, it is unclear what fraction of all foreign nationals entering the United States
are observed by border guards. Hence, it is unclear whether ´ is relatively large or
relatively small. This discussion shows that, unlike the previous example, the parameters
in this context may have o®setting e®ects and unclear magnitudes. Therefore, it is not
as straightforward to judge whether a colorblind policy in this context would also likely
have only small e®ects on the relevant crime rate (i.e. the total number of foreign
terrorist supporters in the U.S.).
6 Conclusion
Many people view racial pro¯ling by law enforcement o±cers as a practice that fosters
mistrust between the racial groups most a®ected by such pro¯ling and law enforcement,
as well as a fundamental violation of civil rights and ethical standards. For these reasons,
many jurisdictions are discussing or implementing policies aimed at eliminating the
practice of law enforcement o±cers using race as a factor in selecting whom to stop,
search, or otherwise investigate more intensely.
While the ethical and constitutional bene¯ts of these anti-pro¯ling policies can be
argued to be quite large, the magnitudes of the costs to these policies are less clear.
If pro¯ling is simply due to racial bias among o±cers, then the costs of implementing
policies that eliminate pro¯ling are likely to be small, as the only ones \hurt" by such
policies are the biased o±cers. However, if pro¯ling is a result of optimal behavior for
unbiased o±cers under imperfect information, then there may be some substantial costs
to banning such behavior, as such bans may lead to increases in the number of people
committing the relevant crimes.
The model developed in this paper primarily looked at racial pro¯ling of this latter
form, where o±cers investigate one race at a higher rate than another because such
behavior is optimal from an e±ciency perspective. Analysis of the equilibrium of this
model reveals several important points. First, for statistical discrimination to occur
with unbiased law enforcement o±cers, one racial group must have a higher fraction of
26\at risk" individuals than the other, in the sense that a greater proportion of one group
could be convinced to commit the relevant crime if the probability of getting caught
were low enough. Such a di®erence across races in a particular jurisdiction could arise
due to a variety of reasons, including racial di®erences in the income distribution, job
opportunities, the age distribution, or political or religious beliefs.
The second point to come out of the model is that for unequal investigation rates
to arise from racially unbiased o±cers, the overall guilt rate from the more frequently
investigated group must be higher than the overall guilt rate from the less frequently
investigated group. However, the guilt rate among the investigated members of the more
frequently investigated group can be greater than, equal to, or less than the guilt rate
among the investigated members of the less frequently investigated group. This result
is important because it emphasizes that while there often exists data regarding guilt
rates among those investigated in particular jurisdictions, such data will generally not
be su±cient for identifying whether unequal investigation rates are due to statistical
discrimination or racial bias. In order to reject the hypothesis that racially unequal
investigation rates are due only to statistical discrimination rather than o±cer bias, it
is necessary to have data regarding the overall guilt rates for each race, data that would
be extremely di±cult to collect.
The ¯nal results coming from the model discuss the extent to which a policy that
eliminates racial pro¯ling will increase (or possibly even decrease) the overall crime
rate in a particular jurisdiction, given the characteristics the jurisdiction. In general, a
colorblind policing policy should lead to smaller increases in the overall crime rate when
the jurisdiction is relatively undiverse, when the racial groups have relatively similar
socio-economic and demographic characteristics, when police can only observe a small
fraction of the overall relevant population, when the penalty for being caught for the
relevant crime is small, and when only a relatively small fraction of each group can be
expected to incur very large bene¯ts from committing the relevant crime.
Applying these results to real world examples of racial pro¯ling suggests that color-
blind policing policies will likely have only a small e®ect on the overall rate at which
small amounts of drugs, guns, and alcohol are carried by motorists on highways. Given
the cost to society for each instance where a small amount of drugs, guns, or alcohol
is carried on a highway is likely quite small (although not necessarily negligible), the
27overall societal cost to implementing a colorblind policy on highway patrolmen can be
argued to be quite low. Alternatively, it is not as clear how large the rate of terrorist
supporters among foreigners entering the United States would change in response to a
colorblind policy imposed on border guards. However, given the potentially tremendous
societal cost associated with terrorism, the societal cost related to any increase in the
relevant crime rate associated with implementing a colorblind policy on border guards
is likely larger than with respect to the highway patrol.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that these results are only suggestive, and that
more precise evidence on actual parameter values would be necessary to make any de¯ni-
tive statements concerning the potential increase in the crime rate associated with im-
plementing a colorblind policing policy in any particular jurisdiction. Moreover, further
analysis of the magnitudes of the bene¯ts to implementing colorblind policies, and how
such bene¯ts may di®er across jurisdictions, is necessary before any statements can be
made concerning whether the societal bene¯ts associated with eradicating racial pro-
¯ling in particular jurisdictions exceed to societal costs. This study is simply meant
to help describe why pro¯ling may persist among law enforcement agencies, and how
the costs to eradicating such behavior will depend on the particular characteristics of a
jurisdiction.
28Appendix
(a) Proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in unconstrained environment








j = 1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
j)): (13)
Hence, the equilibrium value for the proportion of race j carrying contraband, ¼e
j, can




j = ¸j[1 ¡ G(´[1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
j))]c)] (14)
Existence of such a ¼e
j can be con¯rmed by ¯rst noting that equation (14) is con-
tinuous mapping of a non-empty, convex, compact set (i.e. [0,1]) onto itself. Hence,
Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem can be directly applied to con¯rm existence of a solution
to equation (14).
Moreover, this equilibrium value is unique. To see why this is true, ¯rst note that
the derivative of the left-hand side of equation (14) with respect to ¼e
j is strictly positive.














j · 0, the above expression is weakly negative, meaning the right-hand side
of equation (14) is weakly decreasing in ¼e
j. Therefore, there can be only one value for
¼e
j that equates the right-hand side with the left-hand side of equation (14).
Finally, equation (13) shows that pe
j can then be directly calculated using the unique
¼e
j.
29(b) Proof that if ¸b > ¸a, then ¼e
b > ¼e
a
To prove this assertion, it is su±cient to prove that ¼e
j is strictly increasing in ¸j. Taking
the derivative of the right-hand side of equation (14) with respect to ¸j gives
[1 ¡ G(´[1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¼e
j))]c))]
Since the above expression is strictly positive, we know the right-hand side of equation
(14) is increasing in ¸j. Therefore, as ¸j increases, in order maintain equality in equa-
tion (14), ¼e
j must also increase, as by doing so the left-hand side of equation (14) will
increase and right-hand side of equation (14) will decrease (by equation (15)).
(c) Proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in colorblind environment
Note that equilibrium can be de¯ned by a pair of beliefs fpc;¦cg such that




a = pc = 1 ¡ Fg(µ¤(¦c)): (17)
Now, note that equation (16) can be re-written as
¦c = ¸c[1 ¡ G(´pcc)]; (18)
where ¸c = [¯¸b + (1 ¡ ¯)¸a]. Since these equations are of the same form as equations
(13) and (12), the same argument as above can be used to prove existence and unique-
ness of ¦c and pc.
(d) Proof that if ¸b > ¸a, then ¼e
b > ¦c > ¼e
a
As above, de¯ne ¸c = [¯¸b+(1¡¯)¸a]. Given this de¯nition, then we know ¸b > ¸c > ¸a.
From the proof in part (b) above, we then know that ¼e
j is increasing in ¸j, proving this
assertion.
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